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A distinguishing feature of the ECB’s monetary policy setup is the preannouncement of a
minimum bid rate in its weekly repo auctions. However, whenever interest rates are
expected to decline, the minimum bid rate is viewed as too high and banks refrain from
bidding, severely impeding the ECB’s money market management. To shed more light on
banks’ underbidding, we perform a panel analysis of the bidder behavior in the repo
auctions of the Bundesbank where no minimum bid rate was set. Our results indicate that
neither bank’s participation nor the submitted bid amount is significantly affected by an
expected rate cut. This suggests that abandoning the minimum bid rate might increase the
efficiency  of the ECB’s money market management.
Keywords: Monetary Policy Instruments, Auctions, B idder Behavior, Panel
Analysis
JEL-Classification :  C23, D44, E52Zusammenfassung
Nach dem Vorbild der Deutschen Bundesbank spielen wöchentliche Repo-Auktionen (die
Hauptrefinanzierungsgeschäfte) eine zentrale Rolle für die Geldpolitik der Europäischen
Zentralbank. Das dort bereitgestellte Refinanzierungsvolumen bestimmt die Liquidität des
Bankensektors und der dabei von der EZB gesetzte Mindestbietungssatz gilt als geld-
politischer Leitzins für die Zinssätze am Interbankengeldmarkt.
Ausgangspunkt dieser Arbeit ist die Beobachtung, dass die Verwendung eines Mindest-
bietungssatzes bei Zinssenkungserwartungen zu einem unerwünschten Unterbieten der
Banken führt. Im Extremfall eines Bieterstreiks wird das  Liquiditätsmanagement der EZB
merklich behindert.
Thema dieser Studie ist das Bieteverhalten der Banken bei den Repo-Auktionen der Bun-
desbank, die in den 90er Jahren bei den Zinstendern auf die Vorgabe eines Mindestbie-
tungssatzes verzichtete. Auf der Grundlage individueller Bietedaten wird mit Hilfe panel-
ökonometrischer Methoden untersucht, wie verschiedene Faktoren, wie zum Beispiel Zins-
erwartungen, Opportunitätskosten, Zinsunsicherheit oder der Bankentyp die Teilnahmeent-
scheidung und das Bietevolumen einer Bank bei einem Zinstender ohne Mindestbietungssatz
bestimmen. Die empirischen Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Zinserwartungen, auch bei den
Bundesbank Auktionen das Bieteverhalten der Banken beeinflussten. Allerdings verursachen
Zinserwartungen im Gegensatz zur EZB keine abrupten Änderungen im Bieteverhalten und
auch keine Bieterstreiks. Offenbar bewirkte das Fehlen eines Mindestbietungssatzes, dass
sich die Gebote der Banken und damit der Reposatz und die Zinssätze am
Interbankengeldmarkt graduell an ein verändertes Zinsniveau anpassen konnten.Contents
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Bidder Behavior in Repo Auctions
without Minimum Bid Rate:
Evidence from the Bundesbank1
1 Introduction
Following the monetary policy practice of the Bundesbank, repo auctions are the predomi-
nant instrument for the ECB’s money market management. A distinguishing feature of the
ECB’s repo auctions is the announcement of a minimum bid rate which strongly indicates
the ECB’s policy intentions and typically sets a ﬂoor for the short-term interest rates of
the euro area. Yet, when banks expect interest rates to decrease, the current minimum
bid rate is viewed as too high and banks underbid, i.e. they tend to refrain from bidding.
On several occasions banks’ underbidding severely hampered the ECB’s liquidity manage-
ment, increased interest rate volatility and obscured the monetary policy stance.2 The ECB
recently announced rather involved ”measures to improve the eﬃciency of the operational
framework for monetary policy” to keep banks from underbidding, see ECB (2003a). Inter-
estingly, however, the auction format will remain unchanged. In particular, the ECB will
still pre-announce a minimum bid rate.
This paper investigates the bidding behavior of banks not constrained by a minimum bid
rate. We employ a unique data set of individual bids submitted in the repo auctions of
the Bundesbank where no minimum bid rate was set. Apart from the minimum bid rate,
however, the repo auctions of the Bundesbank and the ECB share exactly the same rules.
Therefore, the Bundesbank auctions provide us with almost a natural experiment to study
the role of the minimum bid rate and the ECB’s underbidding problem.
In two recent papers, Nyborg, Bindseil and Strebulaev (2002) and Scalia and Ordine (2002)
investigated how banks’ bidding in the ECB’s repo auctions is inﬂuenced by factors such
1 Financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) through NA-31020102 is gratefully ac-
knowledged. We thank the seminar participants at the Bundesbank and the ECB for helpful comments
and fruitful discussion, and the Bundesbank for providing us access to their data. Corresponding address:
Goethe University Frankfurt, Department of Economics, Mertonstr. 17-21, 60054 Frankfurt am Main, Ger-
many. Email: linzert@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de, nautz@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de, breitung@eos.ect.uni-bonn.de
2 For example, in the repo auctions on February 13 and April 10 in 2001 and more recently in December 2002
and March 2003, banks’ underbidding prevented the ECB from injecting the necessary amount of reserves
into the money market. As a result, money market rates increased sharply although anyone expected
interest rates to decrease, see ECB (2001).– 2 –
as the level of money market rates, interest rate expectations and uncertainty. Nyborg,
Bindseil and Strebulaev (2002) use aggregated bidding data to investigate the winner’s curse
eﬀect and the relation between the repo rate and the secondary market3. Scalia and Ordine
(2002) perform a full-blown panel analysis of banks’ bidding with the focus on the empirical
relevance of country speciﬁc eﬀects. Both studies conﬁrm the underbidding problem in the
ECB’s auctions but remain less explicit on its causes, in particular, the role of the minimum
bid rate.
In line with Scalia and Ordine (2002) we will estimate panel regressions for the probability
of bidding and a bank’s individual bid amount. The latter variable is left-censored since it
can only be observed if a bank actually participates in an auction. This property of the data
is often neglected in the empirical literature on auctions.4 This paper accounts for the eﬀect
of censored variables using a panel tobit approach.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the data and
variables that are used in the following panel regressions. Section 3 presents the empirical
analysis of banks’ bidding in the Bundesbank’s auctions. First, we estimate a logit model to
analyze banks’ participation decision. In a second step, we build on the preceding analysis
employing a panel tobit model to investigate the determinants of a bank’s bid amount.
Section 4 gives a summary of the main results and oﬀers some policy conclusions.
2 Data and theoretical predictions
2.1 The bidding data
The following empirical analysis is based on a unique data set of weekly repo auctions per-
formed by the Bundesbank. We collected individual bidding data (which was not available
in computer readable form) of 275 banks that had submitted their bids at the Land Cen-
tral Bank of Hesse. Bidder codes allow us to track each bidder over time. Hesse contains
Germany’s ﬁnancial center Frankfurt hosting a major part of German banks including large
banks as well as a broad range of small private banks and foreign bank dependencies. There-
fore, the results derived from our sample should be fairly representative for the bidding
3 See also Nyborg, Rydqvist and Sundaresan (2002) for a similar study on Swedish treasury auction.
4 See Scalia and Ordine (2002), but also Bjonnes (2001) who estimates bid functions for the Norwegian
Treasury Bill auctions. A notable exception is Ayuso and Repullo (2001) who investigate banks’ bidding
in the ECB’s ﬁxed rate tenders.– 3 –
behavior of the German banking sector.
In many respects, banks’ bidding behavior in the repo auctions of the Bundesbank and
the ECB appear to be very similar.5 First, large bidders participate more often but their
bids are still small relative to the total bid volume, see Table 1. Second, banks usually do
not submit more than three bids per auction, see Table 2. In fact, the bid rate dispersion
in the Bundesbank’s repo auctions is not higher than in the repo auctions of the ECB,
although there is no minimum bid rate that constrains banks’ bidding. Third, there are
many bidders that participate only infrequently, see Table 3. Only 175 out of 275 Hessian
banks participated at least once in the auctions covered by our data set. A similar share of
active bidders is observed in the repo auctions of the ECB. In contrast to previous empirical
work, we do not remove the bidders never participating in an auction to avoid distorting
eﬀects on the analysis of banks’ participation decision.
Compared with the ECB, which changed the auction format only once in four years, the
Bundesbank was far less reluctant to switch between ﬁxed and variable rate tenders.6 In
fact, there is only one longer period, running from April to November 1995, where the
Bundesbank did not change the auction format. In this period, the Bundesbank performed
its repo auctions exclusively as variable rate tender, which is the auction format used by the
ECB since June 2000.7 We therefore concentrate on this period that provides 33 auctions
with the standard maturity of about two weeks. Note that this period was characterized
by decreasing interest rates, see Figure 1. In particular, in August 1995 the Bundesbank
lowered the rate of its marginal lending facility (the Lombard rate) by 50 basis points. With
regard to banks’ underbidding in the repo auctions of the ECB, it will be interesting to see
how banks’ bidding is aﬀected by the Bundesbank’s interest rate cut.
2.2 Variables and theoretical predictions
Following Scalia and Ordine (2002) and Bjonnes (2001), we characterize the bidding behavior
of a bank by its participation decision and the log of the individual bid amount which will
be explained by various auction as well as bidder-speciﬁc factors.
5 See Nyborg, Bindseil and Strebulaev (2002) and ECB (2001) for descriptive statistics on ECB auctions.
6 Central banks use ﬁxed rate tenders to provide clear signals about the current interest rate target. The
impact of the auction format on interest rate uncertainty is investigated in Nautz (1998) and Manna (2002).
7 The ECB switched to the variable rate tender format in response to banks’ overbidding, i.e. banks increas-
ingly exaggerated their liquidity needs in the bids, see Nautz and Oechssler (2003).– 4 –
Banks’ demand for repos should be aﬀected by the cost of alternative reﬁnancing opportu-
nities. For example, the higher the spread deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the expected
stop out rate and the overnight rate the cheaper is the repo credit.8 Therefore, a higher
spread should increase both, the probability of bidding and the bid amount. We estimated
the expected stop out rate using the error correction equation implied by the cointegrating
relation between the stop out rate and the overnight rate, see Appendix A.
The variable term spread is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the one-month rate and the
overnight rate where e.g. a negative term spread indicates that interest rates are expected
to decline. For the repo auctions of the ECB, expected changes of the ECB’s key interest
rates have a strong impact on banks’ bidding behavior. In particular, when banks expect
decreasing interest rates, underbidding hampers the central banks’ liquidity management.
According to the course of the term spread, banks clearly anticipated the reduction in the
rate of the Bundesbank’s marginal lending facility in August 1995. To capture possible
bidding strike behavior, we introduce a dummy variable underbidding which takes the value
one in the auction preceding the Bundesbank’s rate cut, compare Scalia and Ordine (2002).
The interest rate uncertainty perceived at the auction day is proxied by the variable volatitity
which is estimated using an EGARCH (1,1) model for daily observations of the overnight rate,
compare Nyborg, Rydqvist and Sundaresan (2002). Regarding the impact of uncertainty
on banks’ bidding, the implications of auction theory are ambiguous. On the one hand,
there is the well-known ’winner’s curse’ eﬀect implying that banks bid more cautious when
uncertainty increases. On the other hand, according to Scalia and Ordine (2002), if the
concern is the risk of losing in an auction, not winning, then higher uncertainty may induce
bidders to submit larger bids at higher rates. This behavior would also be in line with
the predictions of multi-period reserve management models, where higher interest rate risk
increases banks’ demand for reserves, see Nautz (1998).
The variable reserve fulﬁlment measures the liquidity need of the banking sector. Since
data on the individual reserve holdings are not available it is deﬁned as the ratio of the
reserve holdings of all German banks prior to the auction and the aggregate minimum reserve
requirement. If reserve holdings are low, banks should have a stronger incentive to participate
in the auction. Since the Bundesbank allowed averaging over the maintenance period, this
8 Note that it would be more appropriate to deﬁne the opportunity cost variable using a money market rate
having the same maturity as the repo. Unfortunately, however, a biweekly money market rate, comparable
to the newly introduced EONIA swap rate used in Scalia and Ordine (2002), is not available.– 5 –
eﬀect might be particularly relevant in the last auction of the maintenance period. We
subsequently deﬁned the dummy variable end of period taking the value 1 if the auction is
the last in the maintenance period.
Finally, we consider two bidder-speciﬁc regressors. The variable maturing allotment is deﬁned
as the log of a bank’s repo volume received two weeks before. This variable captures the fact
that banks often use the biweekly repo credit on a revolving basis. The dummy variables
large, medium,a n dsmall characterize a bank’s size as it is reﬂected in the average bid volume,
see Table 4. We will interact these dummies with all explanatory variables to investigate
how a bank’s bidding behavior is inﬂuenced by its size.
3 Empirical results
3.1 The participation decision of banks
In a ﬁrst step, we analyze the participation decision of an individual bank using a panel
version of the logit model where the dependent variable yit equals one if bank i participates
in auction t ∈{ 1,...,N} and is zero otherwise. Using the logistical distribution Λ, the logit
model is given by
Prob(yit =1 |xit)=Λ ( x 
itβ)=
ex
itβ
1+ex
itβ (1)
where xit and β denote the vector of explanatory variables and the corresponding coeﬃcients,
respectively.
We opted for the random eﬀects logit model since the Hausman-test could not reject the
hypothesis that the individual eﬀects are uncorrelated with the other regressors. The ran-
dom eﬀects model allows for the inclusion of time-invariant bidder-speciﬁc regressors like
the size dummies introduced above. Our speciﬁcation is corroborated by the similarity of
the parameter estimates from the random and the corresponding conditional ﬁxed eﬀects
estimation, see Table 5.
Table 5 presents the estimation results indicating each variable’s impact on the participation
probability. Yet, as in any nonlinear regression the estimated coeﬃcients do not have the
familiar elasticity interpretation. To evaluate the parameter’s economic signiﬁcance, we
report the appropriate marginal eﬀects for the logit case, see column 2. Following Greene– 6 –
(2002), the marginal eﬀect is calculated as
∂E[yit|xit]
∂xit
=
 
Λ(x 
itβ)
 
1 − Λ(x 
itβ)
  
β (2)
indicating the percentage point change of the probability upon a one percent increase of the
explanatory variables. Since its value varies with x, the marginal eﬀects are evaluated at the
sample means of the regressors. In the case of a dummy variable, the derivative with respect
to a small change in the variable is not appropriate. Therefore the marginal eﬀect is given
by:
Marginal Eﬀect = Prob[yit =1 |¯ xit,d=1 ]− Prob[yit =1 |¯ xit,d=0 ]
where d represents the dummy variable and ¯ xit refers to the means of the remaining explana-
tory variables.
According to Table 5 interest rate expectations have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on a bank’s
participation decision. In line with the ECB’s experience, the participation probability
in the repo auctions of the Bundesbank decreases when a negative term spread indicates
that interest rates are expected to decrease. However, given the estimated marginal eﬀect
(0.879) of the term spread, the economic signiﬁcance of rate expectations for banks’ bidding
behavior crucially depends on the existence of a minimum bid rate. To see this, suppose
banks anticipate a rate cut by the central bank of 50 basis points. In the ECB’s monetary
setup, the minimum bid rate prevents the current repo rate and, thus, the overnight rate
from falling. As a result, the term spread will decrease to about minus 50 basis points and
banks’ participation decreases by 50 × 0.879 = 44%. Thus, the introduction of a minimum
bid rate would yield a large reduction in the number of bidders comparable to the bidder
strikes actually experienced by the ECB. Yet, in the Bundesbank auctions, bids were not
constraint by a minimum bid rate such that both, the repo and the overnight rate could fall
in anticipation of a Lombard rate cut, see Figure 1. Therefore, the term spread could adjust
smoothly and was generally much smaller (e.g. 10 basis points) than the actual rate cut.
Accordingly, the impact of rate expectations for the Bundesbank auctions is rather modest
(10×0.879 = 8.8%). Finally, the insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient of the dummy variable underbidding
underlines that the expected rate cut of the Bundesbank had no major impact on banks’
participation decision.
The variable spread measuring the opportunity costs of repos exhibits a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on banks’ participation decision and its coeﬃcient is plausibly signed. Particularly, if the– 7 –
expected repo rate of the central bank is high relative to the money market rate fewer banks
will decide to participate in the auction. Note that the estimated coeﬃcients of the spread
and the term spread suggest that the overnight rate cancels out. The implied parameter
restriction is, however, strongly rejected by the data.
The coeﬃcient of the variable volatility is signiﬁcantly negative. Yet, the marginal eﬀect
indicates that volatility’s inﬂuence on a bank’s participation decision is negligible. We are
therefore reluctant to interpret the coeﬃcient as evidence in favor of the winner’s curse
eﬀect. If banks are short in liquidity, i.e. their reserve fulﬁlment is low, they should have a
stronger incentive to participate in the auction. As in Scalia and Ordine (2002) this is not
substantiated by our data. This plausible eﬀect might be obscured in our estimation because
we were left with aggregate data to proxy the liquidity position of an individual bank.
As expected, the variable maturing allotment has a positive eﬀect on banks’ participa-
tion demonstrating that banks use repos on a revolving basis. According to the estimated
marginal eﬀect, a 70 percent rise in the volume of the maturing repo raises a bank’s partici-
pation probability by one percentage point. At a ﬁrst glance, this eﬀect appears to be small,
but banks’ individual allotments range between zero and 5 billion DM. Due to that large
variation, the maturing allotment is a major determinant of banks’ participation probability.
For example, the average participation probability of a bank with zero maturing allotment is
about 7% while the average probability jumps to 31% if the bank received only one million
DM, the minimum allotment set by the Bundesbank.
According to the estimated eﬀect of the end of period dummy banks’ participation probability
rises in the auctions performed in the last week of the maintenance period. Apparently,
banks bid more often at the end of the period anticipating the increased probability of being
squeezed after the auction, see Nyborg and Strebulaev (2001). The marginal eﬀect indicates
that in the last auction of the reserve period the average participation probability of a bank
rises by 6 percentage points.
Finally, the coeﬃcients of the size-dummies display the obvious fact that large banks partic-
ipate more frequently in the auctions than small banks, see also Table 4. Large banks bid in
the auction not only to satisfy their own liquidity needs but also to resale and actively trade
reserves in the secondary market.– 8 –
Size Eﬀects on a Bank’s Participation
We now turn to analyzing the role of a bank’s size on its participation decision. In order to
investigate whether a bank’s response to a regressor depends on its size, we interact the size
dummies with all other explanatory variables.9 The results are presented in the ﬁrst column
of Table 6. In the second column we display the p-value of the Wald-statistics testing for
the null hypothesis of no size eﬀect.
There are signiﬁcant size eﬀects with regard to banks’ response to interest rate expecta-
tions (term spread) and to expected opportunity cost (spread). For both variables, the
medium-sized banks show the weakest response. The coeﬃcients of the size-speciﬁc matur-
ing allotment variables reﬂects that the seasonality of participating in an auction is more
pronounced for small and medium size banks than for large banks. There is no evidence
for a size eﬀect with regard to the remaining explanatory variables. Notably, there were no
signiﬁcant size interactions with the underbidding dummy implying that the impact of rate
cut expectations on banks’ participation is small irrespective of a bank’s size.
In the last column of Table 6 we report the p-values of the tests on the overall signiﬁcance for
each group of variables. The results of the extended logit model are very much in line with
those obtained for the model without size eﬀects, see Table 5. In particular, the extended
logit model conﬁrms the doubts on the signiﬁcance of volatility for banks’ participation
decision.
3.2 The bid amount
In this section, we advance on the preceding analysis of bidders’ participation decision in-
vestigating the determinants of an individual bank’s bid amount. Naturally, a bank’s bid
volume can only be observed if the bank decides to participate in the auction. As a conse-
quence, the variable bid amount is left-censored and ignoring this property might result in
biased estimates. Following Ayuso and Repullo (2001), we employ a panel tobit model that
accounts for the participation decision of each individual bank.
9 Since large banks participated in almost every auction, the corresponding coeﬃcients can only be estimated
imprecisely, see Table 4.– 9 –
In the tobit model, the variable bid amount, y∗
it, is speciﬁed as
y∗
it = xitβ +  it (3)
where
 it ∼ N(0,σ2)
and the observed bid amount is
yit =



y∗
it if y∗
it > 0
0i f y∗
it ≤ 0.
Notice, that the tobit model uses both, the probability that yit =0( g i v e nxit) and the
distribution of yit given that it is positive. This can be illustrated by the log likelihood
function
ln L =
 
yit>0
−
1
2
 
ln(2π)+l n σ2 +
(yit − x 
itβ)2
σ2
 
+
 
yit=0
ln
 
1 − Φ
 
x 
itβ
σ
  
(4)
where Φ is the standard normal distribution. The ﬁrst part of the log likelihood function
represents the information of the conventional regression on the uncensored observations
while the second part corresponds to the probit model describing a bank’s participation
decision. Obviously, the tobit estimation uses the full set of available information and hence
will generally lead to more eﬃcient estimates. Following Greene (2002), the marginal eﬀects
for the tobit model are given by
∂E[yit|xit]
∂xit
=Φ
 
x 
itβ
σ
 
β (5)
Table 7 shows the estimated coeﬃcients and the resulting marginal eﬀects from the tobit
model explaining a bank’s bid amount. We also display the results of a corresponding naive
GLS panel regression which neglects the information contained in the zero bids. With respect
to the marginal eﬀects of the tobit model, the results from the GLS regression seem to be
broadly in line with the tobit estimates. The general impression is, however, that the GLS
model exaggerates the eﬀects of interest rate expectations, opportunity cost and the reserve
fulﬁllment. As expected, the standard deviations of the estimated coeﬃcients are larger in
the GLS model. The only exception refers to the variable reserve fulﬁllment whose signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient implies that banks bid larger amounts when their liquidity needs are low. This
implausible bidding behavior is not conﬁrmed by the tobit analysis.– 10 –
Our ﬁndings are not in favor of a winner’s curse eﬀect, i.e. bidders do not reduce their
bids signiﬁcantly when volatility of the market interest rate increases. There is, however, a
signiﬁcant impact of the variable maturing allotment and the dummy variable end of period
indicating that bidders bid more aggressively when their demand for reﬁnancing is high and
the danger of becoming squeezed increases.
The estimated coeﬃcients of the term spread indicates that a bank’s bid amount decreases
when a negative term spread reveals that interest rates are expected to decrease. In line
with the results obtained from the logit model, the economic signiﬁcance of the term spread
for the bid amount is rather small. Furthermore, the underbidding dummy capturing the
Bundesbank’s rate cut in August 1995 is far from being signiﬁcant. This demonstrates that
even in the week before an anticipated rate cut, the Bundesbank had no diﬃculties in sup-
plying the appropriate volume of reserves through its repo auction. Thus, in contrast to the
ECB’s underbidding experience, interest rate expectations did not impede the Bundesbank’s
money market management.
Size Eﬀects on the Bid Amount
Table 8 shows the results from the augmented tobit model that incorporates the interac-
tions between the explanatory variables and the size dummies. Size eﬀects are of particular
relevance for monetary policy because central banks prefer ’fair’ auction formats to avoid
any violations of the principle of equal treatment. The tobit model estimates yield strong
evidence in favor of a size eﬀect concerning the impact of the term spread on a bank’s bid
amount in the repo auctions of the Bundesbank. Interestingly, the response of a bank’s bid
amount to interest rate expectations is most pronounced for small banks. This is in contrast
to results obtained for the ECB’s auctions where large banks seem to bid more informed than
small banks, see e.g. Breitung and Nautz (2001). Note that this conﬂicting result might
originate from neglecting the participation decision (i.e. the left-censoring of the data).
In terms of the other variables, allowing for size eﬀects does not alter the main conclusions. In
particular, the insigniﬁcant underbidding dummy and the small marginal eﬀects of the term
spread on the bid amount found in the augmented tobit model conﬁrm that underbidding
was not an issue in the repo auctions of the Bundesbank where no minimum bid rate was
set.– 11 –
4 Conclusions
The crucial diﬀerence between the Bundesbank repo auctions and the ECB’s current practise
is the preannouncement of a minimum bid by the ECB. A major motivation for the current
paper was to evaluate the consequences of this bidding constraint for the ECB’s underbidding
problem. Based on a unique data set of bidders’ individual demand schedules, we perform a
panel analysis of banks’ bidding behavior in repo auctions of the Bundesbank. Speciﬁcally,
we investigate how e.g. interest rate expectations, opportunity cost, volatility, and bidder
size determine banks’ participation decision and a bank’s bid amount.
Analyzing a bank’s bid amount, we explicitly account for the left-censoring of the bidding
data by applying a tobit model that uses both, the probability of a bank’s participation and
the distribution of the bid amount given that it is positive. Using the full set of information,
the tobit model delivers more eﬃcient estimates. In the same vein, in our panel logit analysis
of banks’ participation decision, we did not remove the bidders never participating in an
auction to avoid distorting eﬀects on the estimated probabilities.
Our results indicate that interest rate expectations inﬂuence both, banks’ participation and
the submitted bid amount. However, in terms of the economic signiﬁcance the impact of
interest rate expectations is only modest. An important ﬁnding in this respect is that banks
do not deviate signiﬁcantly in their behavior prior to an anticipated interest rate cut of the
Bundesbank. In the case of the ECB such interest rate expectations have led to underbidding
and even bidder strikes. In the Bundesbank’s auctions banks did not refrain from bidding
but reacted to prevailing rate cut expectations by bidding at lower interest rates. Therefore,
banks kept on bidding because the Bundesbank did not constrain bidders by a minimum bid
rate. It appears that auctions without a minimum bid rate lead to more favorable outcomes
than the current ECB auctions.
This result is of particular interest in the light of recent announcements by the ECB to reor-
ganize its operational framework of monetary policy, see ECB (2003a). All these measures
are designed to stop the underbidding problem by mitigating the role of interest rate expec-
tations for banks’ bidding. To that aim the maintenance period for required reserves will be
determined by the meetings of the Governing councils. Moreover, the ECB emphasized that
rate changes will only occur at those meetings. Finally, the maturity of the repos is reduced– 12 –
to one week. As a result there is no more overlapping of a repo in the next maintenance
period in which the repo rate could possibly change.
Albeit the predictable success of these measures in ﬁghting the underbidding problem, there
are other problems coming along with the introduction of the new operational framework.
The shorter maturity of the repos and the nonoverlapping maturities makes banks’ reserve
management more diﬃcult. In particular, at the very last auction in the maintenance period,
the risk of going out empty handed increases. This may increase bidding rates and banks’
reﬁnancing costs, see ECB (2003b). More importantly, however, the commitment of the ECB
not to change the interest rates during the maintenance period makes the ECB’s interest rate
policy less ﬂexible. Note that it was perceived as a major advantage of weekly repo auctions,
that the central bank can change interest rates ﬂexibly and even at short notice. For example,
situations like September 11 or the war in Iraq may require to react immediately. Therefore,
the credibility of the ECB’s interest rate commitment could be an issue.
To sum up, we do not doubt that the ECB’s measures will serve the purpose to prevent
banks from underbidding. Still, in light of the new measures’ caveats, our results suggest
that abandoning the minimum bid rate would have been another feasible solution. In the
ECB’s current monetary policy setup, the minimum bid rate is the key interest rate that
sets a ﬂoor for short-term interest rates and signals the policy intentions. However, recent
contributions on monetary policy implementation show that neither steering money market
rates nor policy signalling requires a minimum bid rate, see e.g. Guthrie and Wright (2000).– 13 –
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A The expected stop out rate of the auction
Using weekly observations from April to November 1995, we found that the stop out rate
(r) and the interbank overnight rate (i) are cointegrated with a stationary spread, see Nautz
(1997). As a consequence, the expected stop out rate is derived from an error correction
equation which is estimated as follows:
∆rt = −0.007
(1.92)
− 0.121
(3.20)
(r − i)t−1 +0 .662
(5.71)
∆rt−1 +   εt
R2 =0 .62,Q (4) = 1.26 No. of observ.: 31
Notes: The t-values are reported in parenthesis.
B Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Interest rates in the German money market
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Notes: The repo rate corresponds to the stop out rate of the auction. The Lombard rate is the
Bundesbank’s key interest rate of the marginal lending facility which was lowered in August
1995. The overnight rate refers to the bidding days of the 33 auctions covered by our sample
period. Source: Deutsche Bundesbank.– 16 –
Table 1: Distribution of Average Bid Volume
Bid Volume No. of Banks Percent
(in Mio. DM) (Cumulative)
0 100 36.36
1 - 100 132 84.36
101 - 500 29 94.91
501 - 1000 5 96.73
1001 - 3000 4 98.18
≥ 3000 5 100.00
 
275
Notes: The data refers to the 33 Bundesbank auc-
tions covered by our sample period (April to Novem-
ber 1995).
Table 2: Distribution of Number of Bids
No. of bids No. of bidders Percent
(Cumulative)
0 6248 69.25
1 1315 83.33
2 918 93.35
3 445 98.36
4 105 99.52
5 44 100
 
9075
Notes: The data refers to the 33 Bundesbank auc-
tions covered by our sample period (April to Novem-
ber 1995).– 17 –
Table 3: Participation Frequency
No. of auctions No. of banks Percent
(Cumulative)
0 100 36.23
1 - 5 46 52.90
6 - 10 26 62.32
11 - 15 18 68.84
16 - 20 13 73.55
21 - 25 19 80.43
26 - 30 22 88.41
31 - 33 32 100.00
 
275
Notes: The data refers to the 33 Bundesbank auc-
tions covered by our sample period (April to Novem-
ber 1995).
Table 4: Bank Types
Bank Type Bank Category No. of Average Bid Average Participation
Banks Volume/Bank Allotment/Bank Rate
(in Mio. DM) (in Mio. DM)
Large Big banks 5 3490 1130 96.36%
Land banks
Medium Banks with special 87 190 101 49.15%
functions
Regional instit. of
credit coop.
Regional banks
Building associations
Small Credit cooperatives 183 23.9 13.1 21.71%
Saving banks
Branches of foreign
banks
Notes: The data refers to 33 Bundesbank auctions in the period from April to November 1995. Bank
categories correspond to the categorization by the Deutsche Bundesbank.– 18 –
Table 5: The Participation Decision of an Individual Bank: A Panel Logit Analysis
Random Eﬀects Marginal Eﬀects Conditional Fixed
Estimation Eﬀects Estimation
Term spread 8.19 0.879 8.70
(5.16) (5.48)
Underbidding dummy 0.36 - 0.30
(1.20) (0.97)
Spread -11.57 -1.242 -12.14
(-6.82) (-7.14)
Volatility -0.19 -0.020 -0.20
(-2.08) (-2.18)
Reserve fulﬁllment 0.68 - 1.11
(0.55) (0.90)
Maturing allotment 0.13 0.014 0.11
(22.24) (19.15)
End of period dummy 0.74 0.060 0.76
(6.28) (6.41)
Size dummies:
Large 2.51
(1.57)
Medium -4.58
(-3.04)
Small -5.82
(-3.87)
Pseudo-R2 0.1142 0.1048
No. of observations 8525 4495
No. of groups 275 145
Notes: The t-values of the parameter estimates are reported in parenthesis. For the signiﬁcant param-
eters we calculated the marginal eﬀects (see Equation 2) that indicate the economic signiﬁcance of the
variables by the usual elasticity interpretation. Note that the Conditional Fixed Eﬀects estimation is
restricted to banks which participate at least twice. The Pseudo-R
2 measure is calculated according to
Aldrich and Nelson (1984).– 19 –
Table 6: The Participation Decision of an Individual Bank with Size Speciﬁc Regressors
Coeﬃcient H0:n os i z ee ﬀ e c t H0:z e r oe ﬀ e c t
Estimate (p-value) (p-value)
Term spread/large banks 20.36 (0.98)
Term spread/medium banks 0.74 (0.31) 0.0002 0.0000
Term spread/small banks 14.02 (6.45)
Underbidding dummy/large banks 0.19 (0.08)
Underbidding dummy/medium banks 0.12 (0.26) 0.7285 0.5392
Underbidding dummy/small banks 0.60 (1.45)
Spread/large banks -20.71 (-0.92)
Spread/medium banks -4.65 (-1.84) 0.0018 0.0000
Spread/small banks -16.81 (-7.17)
Volatility/large banks -1.24 (-1.06)
Volatility/medium banks -0.13 (-0.96) 0.5788 0.1260
Volatility/small banks -0.24 (-1.92)
Reserve fulﬁllment/large banks 1.60 (0.12)
Reserve fulﬁllment/medium banks -1.23 (-0.67) 0.3998 0.5626
Reserve fulﬁllment/small banks 2.17 (1.26)
Maturing allotment/large banks 0.02 (0.40)
Maturing allotment/medium banks 0.12 (13.67) 0.0187 0.0000
Maturing allotment/small banks 0.15 (17.27)
Period end dummy/large banks 1.07 (0.71)
Period end dummy/medium banks 0.66 (3.59) 0.8521 0.0000
Period end dummy/small banks 0.78 (5.00)
Size dummies
Large -6.23 (-0.40)
Medium -1.75 (-0.79) 0.1123 0.0000
Small -8.12 (-3.89)
Pseudo-R2 0.1094
No. of observations 8525
No. of groups 275
Notes: The size speciﬁc regressors are obtained from the interaction of the explanatory variables xit with
size dummies large, medium,a n dsmall (see Table 4). The t-values of the parameter estimates are
reported in parenthesis. The second column shows the p-values from a χ
2 distributed Wald-test with the
null hypothesis that there are no size eﬀects. The third column reports the p-values from a χ
2 distributed
Wald-test with the hypothesis that the interaction terms being jointly equal to zero. The Pseudo-R
2 is
calculated according to Aldrich and Nelson (1984).– 20 –
Table 7: The Determinants of a Bank’s Bid Amount: A Panel Analysis
Tobit Model Tobit Model Random Eﬀects GLS
Coeﬃcient Estimate Marginal Eﬀect Coeﬃcient Estimate
Term spread 11.59 1.00 1.43
(4.23) (4.27)
Underbidding dummy 0.32 - 0.05
(0.61) (1.97)
Spread -16.55 -1.43 -1.94
(-7.82) (-5.40)
Volatility -0.24 - 0.01
(-1.50) (0.38)
Reserve fulﬁllment 1.32 - 0.67
(0.61) (2.39)
Maturing allotment 0.23 0.02 0.01
(20.41) (7.39)
End of period dummy 0.93 0.08 -0.08
(4.61) (-1.13)
Size dummies
Large 3.95 -
(1.50)
Medium -8.98 -3.46
(-3.43) (-5.10)
Small -12.70 -4.80
(-4.82) (-7.14)
Constant - 21.01
(28.61)
Pseudo-R2 0.161 0.062
No. of observations 8525 2625
No. of groups 275 275
Notes: The t-values of the parameter estimates are reported in parenthesis. For the signiﬁcant pa-
rameters we calculated the marginal eﬀects (see Equation 5) that indicate the economic signiﬁcance of
the variables by the the usual elasticity interpretation. There were 5900 left-cencored observations in
our sample. Note that for the linear Random eﬀects GLS estimation all left-censored observations are
dropped. The Pseudo-R
2 measure is calculated according to Aldrich and Nelson (1984).– 21 –
Table 8: The Determinants of a Bank’s Bid Amount: Tobit Model Estimation with Bank Size Speciﬁc
Regressors
Coeﬃcient H0:n os i z ee ﬀ e c t H0:z e r oe ﬀ e c t
Estimate (p-value) (p-value)
Term spread/large banks 5.19 (0.74)
Term spread/medium banks 1.82 (0.89) 0.0004 0.0000
Term spread/small banks 12.91 (6.63)
Underbidding dummy/large banks -0.70(-0.55)
Underbidding dummy/medium banks -0.01(-0.04) 0.5847 0.7014
Underbidding dummy/small banks 0.42 (1.06)
Spread/large banks -5.64 (-0.75)
Spread/medium banks -6.15 (-2.82) 0.0076 0.0000
Spread/small banks -15.30 (-7.37)
Reserve fulﬁllment/large banks 0.09 (0.02)
Reserve fulﬁllment/medium banks -0.57 (-0.36) 0.5056 0.6187
Reserve fulﬁllment/small banks 2.02 (1.29)
Volatility/large banks -0.23 (-0.57)
Volatility/medium banks -0.36 (-0.30) 0.2357 0.0428
Volatility/small banks -0.31 (-2.78)
Maturing allotment/large banks 0.03 (1.48)
Maturing allotment/medium banks 0.13 (17.90) 0.0000 0.0000
Maturing allotment/small banks 0.20 (23.57)
End of period dummy/large banks 0.09 (0.18)
End of period dummy/medium banks 0.59 (3.91) 0.5445 0.0000
End of period dummy/small banks 0.67 (4.77)
Size dummies
Large 4.78 (0.74)
Medium -1.99 (-1.04) 0.0103 0.0001
Small -8.34 (-4.40)
Pseudo-R2 0.228
No. of observations 8525
No. of groups 275
Notes: The size speciﬁc regressors are obtained from the interaction of the explanatory variables xit with
size dummies large, medium,a n dsmall (see Table 4). The t-values of the parameter estimates are
reported in parenthesis. Note that there were 5900 left-cencored observations in our sample. For further
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